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precedent to the maintenance of a civil rights action in state court,
notwithstanding that a notice of claim need not be filed to main-
tain such an action in federal court.
In the area of appellate practice, two important developments
are explored in The Survey. In Morgenthau v. Erlbaum, the Court
approved the District Attorney's use of the declaratory judgment
action as a means of appealing an unfavorable interlocutory ruling
by a lower criminal court. On the civil side, the Court of Appeals,
in Hecht v. City of New York, held that the Appellate Division has
no authority under CPLR 5522 to grant relief to a party who fails
to undertake an appeal, absent a united and inseverable interest
with the successful appellant. It is hoped that the discussion of
these cases in The Survey will prove to be of interest to the New
York bench and bar.
CIVIL PRACTICE LAW AND RuLEs
Article 30-Remedies and Pleadings
CPLR 3001: Action for declaratory relief is a procedurally proper
means of obtaining collateral review of an interlocutory criminal
court order
Section 3001 of the CPLR provides that a court "may render a
declaratory judgment" to resolve "the rights and other legal rela-
tions of the parties to a justiciable controversy."1 Although the
statute is broad in scope,2 some courts have exercised the granted
- CPLR 3001 (1974). Section 3001 of the CPLR provides:
The supreme court may render a declaratory judgment having the effect of a final
judgment as to the rights and other legal relations of the parties to a justiciable
controversy whether or not further relief is or could be claimed. If the court de-
clines to render such a judgment it shall state its grounds.
Id. Section 3017(b), which sets requirements for a party seeking a declaratory judgment,
provides:
In an action for a declaratory judgment, the demand for relief in the complaint
shall specify the rights and other legal relations on which a declaration is re-
quested and state whether further or consequential relief is or could be claimed
and the nature and extent of any such relief which is claimed.
Id. 3017(b).
2 See James v. Alderton Dock Yards, Ltd., 256 N.Y. 298, 305, 176 N.E. 401, 404 (1931);
3 WK&M 3001.06, at 30-28 to 29 (1982). There is no inherent limitation on the type of
declaratory relief available under the Declaratory Judgment Act, CPLR 3001. Maguire v.
Monaghan, 206 Misc. 550, 555, 134 N.Y.S.2d 320, 326 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1954), afl'd
mem., 285 App. Div. 926, 139 N.Y.S.2d 883 (1st Dep't 1955); see also Posner, Declaratory
Judgments in New York, 1 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 129, 130 (1927) (broad scope of declaratory
judgment statute intended to allow courts unfettered discretion). Since there must be a
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discretion to restrict the availability of declaratory relief.3 This has
"justiciable controversy" between the parties for declaratory relief to be granted, CPLR
3001 (1974), the courts do not have the power to render advisory opinions. Self-Insurers'
Ass'n v. State Indus. Comm'n, 224 N.Y. 13, 16, 119 N.E. 1027, 1028 (1918). To present a
"justiciable controversy," the plaintiff must possess a "legally protectible interest," 3
WK&M 3001.04, at 30-15 (1982), or "a substantial interest in the determination of the
controversy," Brechner v. Incorporated Village of Lake Success, 23 Misc. 2d 159, 160, 201
N.Y.S.2d 254, 256 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1960). In other words, the plaintiff's rights must
be in danger of infringement by the defendant. Maguire v. Monaghan, 206 Misc. 550, 553,
134 N.Y.S.2d 320, 324 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1954) (quoting 1 W. ANDERSON, AcTIONS FOR
DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS 58 (2d ed. 1951)). If the action is brought to determine the valid-
ity of a statute, the plaintiff must show a legally protected interest not shared by all citizens
of the state. See Bull v. Stichman, 273 App. Div. 311, 316, 78 N.Y.S.2d 279, 283 (3d Dep't),
afl'd mem., 298 N.Y. 516, 80 N.E.2d 661 (1948).
An additional element of "justiciability" is the presence of an actual controversy.
Monaghan, 206 Misc. at 554, 134 N.Y.S.2d at 325. See generally 3 WK&M 3001.05, at 30-
23 (1982) (necessity of a controversy between adverse legal interests). This controversy must
not be moot. See, e.g., Knauff v. Board of Educ., 57 Misc. 2d 456, 458, 293 N.Y.S.2d 133, 135
(Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1968). It must be definite, substantial, and ripe for final determi-
nation. Park Ave. Clinical Hosp. v. Kramer, 26 App. Div. 2d 613, 614, 271 N.Y.S.2d 747, 750
(4th Dep't 1966) (quoting 1 W. ANDERSON, supra, at 51), aff'd mem., 19 N.Y.2d 958, 228
N.E.2d 411, 281 N.Y.S.2d 359 (1967). A controversy is ripe if the parties have adverse inter-
ests that have collided and resulted in harm, or else threaten to do so. See Monaghan, 206
Misc. at 554, 134 N.Y.S.2d at 325. Declaratory relief is unique, however, because neither an
actual infringement of rights nor alternate coercive relief are necessary. See, e.g., Town of
Ramapo v. Village of Spring Valley, 40 Misc. 2d 589, 591, 243 N.Y.S.2d 569, 571-72 (Sup. Ct.
Rockland County 1962) (declaratory relief available to test validity of contract although it
had not been breached), appeal dismissed, 13 N.Y.2d 918, 193 N.E.2d 892, 244 N.Y.S.2d 67
(1963).
S See Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 50 N.Y.2d 889, 891, 408 N.E.2d 673, 675, 430 N.Y.S.2d
266, 267 (1980). Although justiciability is the sole requirement of CPLR 3001, declaratory
relief is discretionary in character. Id.; Posner, supra note 2, at 133. See generally 3 WK&M
% 3001.07, at 30-68.3 (1982) (discretionary nature of the CPLR 3001 remedy emphasized by
use of the words "may render" instead of "shall have the power"). The court must exercise
this discretion with care, James v. Alderton Dock Yards Ltd., 256 N.Y. 298, 305, 176 N.E.
401, 403 (1931), and may not act arbitrarily or capriciously, 3 WK&M 3001.08, at 30-72
(1982); Posner, supra note 2, at 133. The statutory requirement that the court state the
grounds for the denial of declaratory relief helps ensure the proper exercise of discretion. 3
WK&M I 3001.08, at 30-73 (1982). Courts have construed this discretion provision as per-
mitting a declaratory judgment action to be entertained only when it will serve some neces-
sary and useful purpose. Davis Constr. Corp. v. County of Suffolk, 112 Misc. 2d 652, 656,
447 N.Y.S.2d 355, 359 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1982), aff'd mem., 95 App. Div. 2d 819, 464
N.Y.S.2d 519 (2d Dep't 1983); National Sur. Corp. v. Peccechio, 48 Misc. 2d 77, 77, 264
N.Y.S.2d 177, 178 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1965); Seaboard Sur. Co, v. Massachusetts Bind-
ing & Ins. Co., 42 Misc. 2d 435, 436-37, 248 N.Y.S.2d 302, 304 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1964);
cf. Westchester Mortgage Co. v. Grand Rapids & LR.R., 246 N.Y. 194, 202, 158 N.E. 70, 73
(1927) (action for declaratory relief does not lie where only effect of judgment would be to
remove to New York courts issue which could properly be determined in pending Rhode
Island action). For example, declaratory relief will not be allowed where it would produce a
multiplicity of suits, fail to terminate the dispute, or result in a fragmented determination. 3
WK&M I 3001.09d, at 30-83 (1982). Where another action, involving the same issues, is
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resulted in inconsistent decisions regarding the availability of a de-
claratory action to obtain review of a prior adjudication.4 Recently,
pending between the same parties, courts have consistently exercised their discretion to
deny declaratory relief. Id. 3001.09q at 30-73 to -74; see, e.g., Stevens v. Medina, 63 App.
Div. 2d 925, 925, 406 N.Y.S.2d 99, 100 (1st Dep't 1978); see also Kelly's Rental, Inc. v. City
of New York, 44 N.Y.2d 700, 702, 376 N.E.2d 915, 916, 405 N.Y.S.2d 443, 444 (1978) (per
curiam); Stuyvesant Ins. Co. of New York v. Perfetto, 37 Misc. 2d 739, 741, 236 N.Y.S.2d
301, 303 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1962), aff'd mem., 20 App. Div. 2d 676, 247 N.Y.S.2d 1010
(2d Dep't 1964). Absent identity of issues, however, another pending action does not, in and
of itself, mandate dismissal of the action for declaratory relief. Davis Constr. Corp., 112
Misc. 2d at 656, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 359.
4 Compare Burnham v. Bennett, 141 Misc. 514, 518, 252 N.Y.S. 788, 793 (Sup. Ct. Al-
bany County 1931) (allowing a determination of a party's rights arising from a separate
action), affd mem., 235 App. Div. 751, 256 N.Y.S. 938 (3d Dep't), affd mem., 259 N.Y. 655,
182 N.E. 222 (1932), with Kings County Trust Co. v. Melville, 127 Misc. 374, 375, 216
N.Y.S. 278, 279 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1926) (disallowing review of a determination of a
court of co-ordinate jurisdiction), aff'd mem., 223 App. Div. 770, 227 N.Y.S. 805 (2d Dep't
1928). In Burnham, the plaintiff recovered a judgment in the Court of Claims for the taking
of her property by the state. 141 Misc. at 514, 252 N.Y.S. at 789-90. She did not have the
judgment entered since the state had indicated doubt as to its validity and because interest
would cease to accrue 30 days after the entry. Id. at 514-15, 252 N.Y.S. at 790. The court
reasoned that since the state's position would probably lead to time-consuming litigation,
the plaintiff was in danger of losing her interest on the judgment, and therefore was entitled
to a declaration of her rights. Id. at 517-18, 252 N.Y.S. at 793. This holding directly conflicts
with Melville, where an action was brought to determine the validity of a lease that had
been approved by court order. Melville, 127 Misc. at 375, 216 N.Y.S. at 279. The Melville
court reasoned that an attempt to review the validity of the judgment of a court of coordi-
nate jurisdiction is entirely beyond the purpose and scope of declaratory relief. Id.; see, e.g.,
Knauff v. Board of Educ., 57 Misc. 2d at 460, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 137 (Special Term refused to
issue declaration allocating costs to state and county where family court had already denied
such relief); Greenbaum v. New York City Hous. Auth., 4 Misc. 2d 781, 783, 147 N.Y.S.2d
315, 317 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1955) (plaintiff could not obtain review of final order issued
by municipal court where issues were or should have been adjudicated in prior action);
Lane-Marvey Corp. v. McCaffrey, 204 Misc. 166, 167, 119 N.Y.S.2d 830, 832-33 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County) (action for declaratory judgment unavailable to plaintiff who had been found
guilty and has appeal pending), aff'd mem., 282 App. Div. 1013, 126 N.Y.S.2d 197 (1st Dep't
1953).
In other states, declaratory relief generally has been held to be an improper means of
reviewing prior judgments. See, e.g., Bryarly v. State, 232 Ind. 47, 50, 111 N.E.2d 277, 280
(1953) (where appellants' rights were finally and effectively determined in criminal action
declaratory judgment may not be used as substitute for appeal); Back's Guardian v. Bardo,
234 Ky. 211, 214, 27 S.W.2d 960, 963 (1930) (Declaratory Judgment Act was never intended
to be a "substitute for trial"); Koenig v. Koenig, 191 S.W.2d 269, 271-72 (Mo. Ct. App. 1945)
(purpose of declaratory relief was to obtain declaration of rights not previously determined
and not to determine whether other rights of same parties had been properly adjudicated in
prior action). Federal courts also have denied review. See, e.g., Travelers Ins. Co. v. Wechs-
ler, 34 F. Supp. 721, 723 (S.D. Fla. 1940). In Travelers, the court found that where the same
parties previously had been involved in litigation concerning the same subject matter, and
had had their rights determined in a New York State court, declaratory relief was not avail-
able. Id. The court reasoned that the plaintiff was actually seeking to relitigate their parties'
rights, whereas the Declaratory Judgment Act was designed to allow parties to obtain a
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in Morgenthau v. Erlbaum,5 the Court of Appeals held that an ac-
tion for declaratory relief may be a proper means of obtaining re-
view of a criminal court's order declaring a statute uncon-
stitutional. 6
In People v. Link,7 Judge William M. Erlbaum of the Criminal
Court of the City of New York ruled unconstitutional subdivision 2
of CPL 340.40, which directs that crimes imposing a maximun sen-
tence of less than 6 months shall be tried before a judge without a
jury." To contest this ruling, District Attorney Morgenthau com-
menced an action under Article 78 of the CPLR, which was later
converted to an action for declaratory relief.9 Special Term enter-
tained the action and declared section 340.40 constitutional.10 The
Appellate Division, First Department, affirmed.11
On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that a declaratory judg-
ment action may be a proper means for obtaining review of a crim-
inal court's interlocutory order.12 Chief Judge Cooke, writing for a
unanimous Court, reviewed the historical availability of the writ of
prohibition as the procedurally proper means of obtaining such re-
view. 3 The Court then identified the policies underlying the aban-
declaration of rights that would otherwise escape adjudication. Id.; see 28 U.S.C. § 2201
(Supp. II 1978) (current version of the Declaratory Judgment Act).
59 N.Y.2d 143, 451 N.E.2d 150, 464 N.Y.S.2d 392 (1983).
Id. at 151-52, 451 N.E.2d at 155, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 397.
107 Misc. 2d 973, 436 N.Y.S.2d 581 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct. N.Y. County 1981).
Id. at 973 & n.2, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 581 & n.2. Judge Erlbaum reasoned that despite the
relatively short maximum sentence of 3 months, prostitution is a serious offense, warranting
a jury trial. Id. at 979, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 586-87.
9 59 N.Y.2d at 146, 451 N.E.2d at 152, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 394.
10 Morgenthau v. Erlbaum, 112 Misc. 2d 30, 35, 445 N.Y.S.2d 997, 1000 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1981). Special Term entertained the action for a declaratory judgment against both
the original criminal defendants and Judge Erlbaum. Id. at 30, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 998. The
court declared that since the statute was constitutional, the defendants in the criminal pro-
ceeding were not entitled to jury trials. Id. at 35, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 1000.
" Morgenthau v. Erlbaum, 89 App. Div. 2d 1062, 454 N.Y.S.2d 487 (1st Dep't 1982)
(mem.).
12 59 N.Y.2d at 145-46, 451 N.E.2d at 151, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 393.
Is Id. at 149, 451 N.E.2d at 153-54, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 395-96. The writ of prohibition long
had been recognized as the appropriate means of blocking the enforcement of a criminal
court order in cases where no other remedy was available, and where there was a possibility
of a miscarriage of justice. People ex rel. Lemon v. Supreme Court, 245 N.Y. 24, 35, 156
N.E. 84, 87 (1927). The writ was subsequently abandoned as the proper means of obtaining
collateral review. State v. King, 36 N.Y.2d 59, 62-63, 324 N.E.2d 351, 353-54, 364 N.Y.S.2d
879, 882 (1975). A recent Court of Appeals case, Gold v. Gartenstein, 54 N.Y.2d 627, 425
N.E.2d 892, 442 N.Y.S.2d 504 (1981) (mem.), has held that a writ of prohibition is not avail-
able to challenge a criminal court ruling. Id. at 629, 425 N.E.2d at 892, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 504.
Gartenstein dealt with criminal court Judge Gartenstein's declaration in People v. Darry P.
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donment of the writ of prohibition in such cases as both the poten-
tial for a proliferation of collateral appeals and the avoidance of
the litigation of factual issues in a non-criminal proceeding. 14 After
examining the declaratory judgment action in light of these poli-
cies, the Court found that they were not violated in cases where
the declaration sought involved the "validity of a statute, the de-
termination of which does not require the resolution of any factual
disputes" and where the action does not constitute an immediate
attempt to interfere with the ongoing criminal proceeding. 15 The
Court also observed that the jurisdictional impediments to the use
of a writ of prohibition do not apply to the declaratory action
since, unlike the writ, declaratory relief is an ordinary remedy."6
Chief Judge Cooke noted that declaratory relief is often used to
determine the validity of penal statutes, although its availability to
make factual determinations is more restricted.7 Lastly, the Court
that section 340.40(7) of the CPL was unconstitutional as applied to juvenile offenders. See
People v. Darry P., 96 Misc. 2d 12, 32, 408 N.Y.S.2d 880, 893 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct. Kings
County 1978). The district attorney brought an action for a writ to prohibit enforcement of
the criminal court's order granting a jury trial to the juveniles. See Gartenstein, 54 N.Y.2d
at 628, 425 N.E.2d at 892, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 504. The Court of Appeals held that the writ was
not available because the criminal court had not acted without authority. Id.
The extraordinary remedy of prohibition is appropriate only in situations where a court
acts or threatens to act without jurisdiction. Nigrone v. Murtagh, 36 N.Y.2d 421, 423-24, 330
N.E.2d 45, 46, 369 N.Y.S.2d 75, 77 (1975). Since determination of the validity of a statute is
a proper exercise of a court's jurisdiction, see Smith v. Hartman, 208 Misc. 880, 886, 144
N.Y.S.2d 13, 18 (Sup. Ct. Ontario County 1955), an alleged error in such a ruling is not an
adequate basis for the use of a writ of prohibition, see, e.g., State v. King, 36 N.Y.2d at 62,
324 N.E.2d at 353, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 882 (involving alleged error of law); Murtagh, 36 N.Y.2d
at 426, 330 N.E.2d at 47, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 79 (involving prosecutorial misconduct). This is
true even when the error alleged in a particular case is not appealable, State v. King, 36
N.Y.2d at 62, 324 N.E.2d at 353, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 882, or when failure to resolve an issue
raised in an underlying criminal proceeding would be disadvantageous to both the defend-
ant and the prosecution, Nigrone, 36 N.Y.2d at 426, 330 N.E.2d at 47, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 79.
14 59 N.Y.2d at 151, 451 N.E.2d at 155, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 397.
'- Id. at 151-52, 451 N.E.2d at 155, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 397. In permitting the declaratory
action, the Court held that such action would not lie against the original criminal defen-
dants. Id. at 152, 451 N.E.2d at 155, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 397.
,6 Id. at 147, 451 N.E.2d at 152, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 394. The Erlbaum Court distinguished
writs of prohibition from declaratory actions on two grounds. First, prohibition is limited to
review of judicial acts of a public nature, whereas declaratory relief is also available as a
private remedy in a broader range of circumstances. Id. at 147-48, 451 N.E.2d at 153, 464
N.Y.S.2d at 395. Second, although the extraordinary writ of prohibition is not available
where an ordinary remedy can be obtained, declaratory relief may be granted even if other
adequate remedies exist. Id. at 148, 451 N.E.2d at 153, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 395.
17 Id. at 150, 451 N.E.2d at 154, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 396. The Court noted that although a
determination of the constitutionality of a penal statute would not interfere with the orderly
administration of criminal law, a declaration of the applicability of such a statute to a given
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indicated that for a ruling to be subject to declaratory relief, it
must be of such a nature that it probably would be decided the
same way in subsequent prosecutions and that the issue involved
would likely arise often enough for such rulings to burden unduly
the administration of justice.1 8 Upon finding that Judge Erlbaum's
ruling on the constitutionality of the statute was of this nature, the
Court reached the merits of the case and held CPL section 340.40
constitutional.19
It is submitted that the Erlbaum Court's expansion of the
concept of declaratory relief, though unprecedented, is necessary,
pragmatic, and proper.20 The criminal court ruling as to the consti-
set of circumstances would. Id.
I8 Id. at 152, 451 N.E.2d at 155, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 397. The Court declined, however, to
limit the circumstances under which a declaratory action could be brought. Id. The Court
stated that the ruling as to the right to a jury trial would be likely to have a significant
effect on future prosecutions, given that jury trials would be demanded with greater fre-
quency in prostitution cases than they had in the past. Id. at 152-53, 45 N.E.2d at 155, 464
N.Y.S.2d at 397. The result would inevitably be "unmanageable delays" in prosecution. Id.
at 153, 451 N.E.2d at 156, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 398. The Court also indicated that only an appli-
cation for relief by the People would be considered, since defendants already have a right to
appeal in criminal proceedings. Id. at 152, 451 N.E.2d at 155, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 397.
19 Id. at 154, 451 N.E.2d at 156, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 398. The Court reasoned that to deter-
mine the seriousness of the offense of prostitution based on its "legal, moral, and psycholog-
ical implications" would require a new determination by each judge faced with a request for
a jury trial in a prostitution case. Id. at 153, 451 N.E.2d at 156, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 398. Since
under current Supreme Court decisions only offenses carrying a sentence of more than 6
months or more are classified as serious crimes, the Court concluded that prostitution is a
"petty offense" within the meaning of the sixth amendment and consequently, defendants
accused of this offense have no constitutional right to a jury trial. Id. at 154, 451 N.E.2d at
156, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 398.
20 Although earlier decisions may have paved the way for the Erlbaum Court's issuance
of a declaratory judgment to determine the validity of an interlocutory criminal court order,
none have gone as far. See, e.g., New York Foreign Trade Zone Operators, Inc. v. State
Liquor Auth., 285 N.Y. 272, 275, 34 N.E.2d 316, 318 (1941); Finkelstein, Mauriello, Kaplan
& Levine, P.C. v. McGuirk, 90 Misc. 2d 649, 652, 395 N.Y.S.2d 377, 379 (Sup. Ct. Orange
County 1977); Burnham v. Bennett, 141 Misc. 514, 518, 252 N.Y.S. 788, 793 (Sup. Ct. Al-
bany County 1931), aff'd mem., 235 App. Div. 751, 256 N.Y.S. 938 (3d Dep't), aff'd mem.,
259 N.Y. 655, 182 N.E. 222 (1932). For example, in New York Operators, the Court of Ap-
peals permitted declaratory relief to be used to determine the applicability of a penal stat-
ute to a plaintiff under threat of criminal prosecution. 285 N.Y. at 278, 34 N.E.2d at 319-20.
The Court sanctioned this interference with criminal law because a refusal to consider the
issue would have left jural relations unstable and interfered with the plaintiff's right to con-
duct his business. Id., 34 N.E.2d at 319. In Finkelstein, the supreme court allowed an action
for declaratory relief where a criminal proceeding technically had been commenced, but the
petitioner had not yet come under the jurisdiction of the court. 90 Misc. 2d at 651-52, 395
N.Y.S.2d at 379. The Finkelstein court reasoned that enjoining further criminal proceedings
did not constitute an intervention in an ongoing criminal court proceeding because the relief
requested was a declaration of the validity of the applicable statute. Id. The Burnham case
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tutionality of section 340.40 of the CPL was not reviewable on ap-
peal;21 this absence of a conclusive determination results in an un-
certainty in the law that impedes both the prosecutor's
performance of his duties and the administration of justice.22 Our
system of criminal justice has long been plagued by the uncer-
tainty created by such non-reviewable lower court decisions.23
Moreover, the courts and legislative bodies of the states have been
unable as of yet to arrive at an adequate procedure for obtaining
such review.24 Since declaratory relief was designed to be used in
involved the use of declaratory relief to review a judgment rendered in a non-criminal pro-
ceeding. 141 Misc. at 514, 252 N.Y.S. at 789; see supra note 4.
21 See State v. King, 36 N.Y.2d 59, 63, 324 N.E.2d 351, 354, 364 N.Y.S.2d 879, 882
(1975). Statutes have been long recognized as the exclusive grounds for appellate jurisdic-
tion in criminal cases. E.g., People v. Zerillo, 200 N.Y. 443, 446, 93 N.E. 1108, 1109 (1911).
In New York, availability of appeal from a criminal court ruling is governed by Article 450
of the CPL. See CPL § 450 (1971 & Supp. 1983-1984). The People may take an appeal only
from the following rulings: a sentence other than death, CPL § 450.50(4) (1982); an order
vacating or setting aside a death sentence, id. § 450.80; an order of dismissal, id. § 450.20(1),
(2); an order setting aside a verdict, id. § 450.20(3), or a sentence, id. § 450.20(6); an order
denying the People's motion to set aside a sentence, id. § 450.20(4); an order vacating a
judgment, id. § 450.20(5); or a pretrial suppression order, id. § 450.20(8).
22 See Miller, Appeals by the State in Criminal Cases, 36 YAL.E L.J. 486, 505 (1926-
1927); Note, Criminal Procedure-Moot Appeal by the State-Movement for State Ap-
peal, 17 NE. L. BULL. 207, 207 (1938) [hereinafter cited as Note, Criminal Procedure].
Since under such a system there may be no other procedure for correcting errors of law,
there appears to be a need for some means of acquiring an authoritative statement of law
from an appellate court. Miller, supra, at 508; Note, Appeals by the State in Criminal
Cases, 19 MICH. L. REv. 79, 80 (1920) [hereinafter cited as Note, Appeals by the State]; see
Note, Criminal Procedure, supra, at 209.
13 See supra note 22; infra note 24 and accompanying text.
24 See Note, Criminal Procedure, supra note 22, at 210. Some jurisdictions authorize
statutory post-acquittal appeal by the state for the sole purpose of laying down the law for
future cases. R. MORELAND, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 274 (1959). Such an appeal deals
only with a pure question. Id. The judgment of the lower court cannot be reversed on re-
view, and the case is treated as if it were moot. Id. The Supreme Court has criticized this
approach, however, for presenting the issues in a non-adversarial context, which purportedly
prevents a full exposition of the facts and correct resolution of the question presented.
United States v. Evans, 213 U.S. 297, 300 (1909). In Evans, the Court held unconstitutional
a District of Columbia provision that granted a limited right of appeal to the prosecution in
criminal cases. Id. at 301. The Court believed that parties litigating similar matters in the
future should have the opportunity to be heard and should not be bound "by decisions
made in what are practically 'moot' cases, where opposing views have not been presented."
Id. at 300 (quoting United States v. Evans, 30 App. D.C. 58, 61 (1907)). Another frequent
criticism of this type of state appeal is that a contrary determination would effectively stig-
matize the defendant in the initial criminal proceeding as a party who escaped punishment
due to a technicality. Miller, supra note 22, at 505; Note, Criminal Procedure, supra note
22, at 214.
New York courts are also familiar with the dilemma of non-reviewable lower court deci-
sions. See, e.g., Gold v. Gartenstein, 54 N.Y.2d 627, 629, 425 N.E.2d 892, 892, 442 N.Y.S.2d
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instances where no other remedy would be adequate, 5 it is submit-
ted that the issuance of a declaratory judgment in Erlbaum was
appropriate."
It similarly is suggested that the Court's holding does not con-
travene the rationale underlying the rule that declaratory relief
may not be used to review the validity of a previous adjudication.2 7
At least one lower court has held that a declaration may issue if
there exists a substantial controversy regarding the validity of the
antecedent judgment, particularly when that judgment is of great
import to the plaintiff.28 Moreover, New York cases which have de-
nied review have not presented as compelling a situation for de-
claratory relief as that confronted by the Erlbaum Court.2 9 Indeed,
504, 504 (1981) (mem.); People ex rel. Lemon v. Supreme Court, 245 N.Y. 24, 35, 156 N.E.
84, 87 (1927). For some time, review of such questions was available through the use of the
writ of prohibition. See supra note 13. This method was abandoned as procedurally im-
proper in Gartenstein, leaving New York prosecutors without a mechanism for obtaining
review. See 54 N.Y.2d at 629, 425 N.E.2d at 892, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 504; supra note 13.
25 See SmGEL § 436, at 578; see also James v. Alderton Dock Yards Ltd., 256 N.Y. 298,
305, 176 N.E. 401, 403-04 (1931). The general purpose of a declaratory judgment is to serve
some pragmatic end in stabilizing an uncertain jural relation. 3 WK&M 3001.03, at 30-12
to -13; see New York Pub. Interest Research Group, Inc. v. Carey, 42 N.Y.2d 527, 530, 369
N.E.2d 1155, 1157, 399 N.Y.S.2d 621, 623 (1977) (courts should not perform useless or futile
acts and should refrain from resolving legal questions lacking an immediate practical effect);
Harry M. Stevens, Inc. v. Medina, 63 App. Div. 2d 925, 925, 406 N.Y.S.2d 99, 100 (1st Dep't
1978) (declaratory relief should not be employed when unnecessary).
26 Courts in New York State have recognized that when a constitutional question is
presented, and no question of fact is involved, declaratory relief is both appropriate and
necessary. Fenster v. Leary, 20 N.Y.2d 309, 313, 229 N.E.2d 426, 430, 282 N.Y.S.2d 739, 743
(1967); Dun & Bradstreet v. City of New York, 276 N.Y. 198," 206-07, 11 N.E.2d 728, 732
(1937). The constitutional validity of a penal statute also has been recognized as a proper
subject for declaratory relief. Reed v. Littleton, 275 N.Y. 150, 156, 9 N.E.2d 814, 817 (1937);
3 WK&M T 3001.06g, at 30-49 to -54 (1982).
27 One reason often advanced to justify refusal to declare the validity of a prior judg-
ment is that, having already been decided, the controversy is now moot. See, e.g., New York
Foreign Trade Zone Operators, Inc. v. State Liquor Auth., 285 N.Y. 272, 276, 34 N.E.2d 316,
319 (1941). For example, in Greenbaum v. New York City Hous. Auth., 4 Misc. 2d 781, 147
N.Y.S.2d 315 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1956), the court held that a final order issued in munic-
ipal court was not subject to collateral attack by an action seeking a declaration that the
applicable statute was unconstitutional. Id. at 783, 147 N.Y.S.2d at 318. The court reasoned
that a declaratory judgment could not be used to review previously adjudicated and stabi-
lized legal relations, as such review would serve no useful purpose. Id. at 784, 147 N.Y.S.2d
at 318. It is submitted, however, that the Erlbaum controversy was not moot; indeed, the
prior ruling served to create the controversy rather than to settle it.
28 Burnham v. Bennett, 141 Misc. 514, 517-18, 252 N.Y.S. 788, 793 (Sup. Ct. Albany
County 1931); see supra note 4.
29 See 59 N.Y.2d at 145-46, 451 N.E.2d at 151, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 393. The decision in
People v. Link gave rise to uncertainty in the law. Id. at 154-55, 451 N.E.2d at 156-57, 464
N.Y.S.2d at 398-99. The importance of uniformity in the law is evidenced by Court of Ap-
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the far-reaching effects which the lower court's ruling would have
had distinguished Erlbaum from those cases in which review was
denied.30
It is further suggested that the Court's decision is consonant
with the policies behind the exclusively statutory nature of crimi-
nal appeals.31 Two major concerns underlie this limited appealabil-
ity: fear of creating a delay-causing proliferation of appeals,3 2 and a
hesitancy to interfere with criminal trials, which are designed to
dispose of all issues in a single action. 3 By defining the boundaries
of the applicability of declaratory relief, the Erlbaum Court dispels
the fear of delay due to prolific appeals. 4 Additionally, the Court's
refusal to entertain the action against the original criminal defen-
peals decisions allowing direct appellate review of issues which have become abstract or
academic due to lapse of time, but which, if left alone, would leave the law in an uncertain
state due to inconsistent decisions. J.B. Lyon Co. v. Morris, 261 N.Y. 497, 499, 185 N.E. 711,
711 (1933); Norton v. Sutphin, 158 N.Y. 130, 131, 52 N.E. 723, 723 (1899). The Court has
recognized, however, that such an appeal is only available in exceptional situations where
the "urgency of establishing a rule of future conduct is imperative and manifest." J.B. Lyon
Co. v. Morris, 266 N.Y. at 499, 185 N.E. at 711. Where questions left unsettled would affect
only the petitioner, review on appeal may not be granted. See id. at 498-99, 185 N.E. at 711.
But in situations where the decision would have far-reaching effects on the entire state, and
where numerous other transactions of a similar character are likely to arise frequently, the
appeal should be heard. Id. The Erlbaum case, it is suggested, satisfies these factors in favor
of hearing the case.
80 See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text. Courts have recognized the propriety
of declaratory relief in other situations having far-reaching social ramifications. See Finkel-
stein, Mauriello, Kaplan & Levine, P.C. v. McGuirk, 90 Misc. 2d 649, 653, 395 N.Y.S.2d 377,
380 (Sup. Ct. Orange County 1977) (far-reaching implications of needlessly subjecting public
officers to criminal prosecution). See generally 3 WK&M 1 3001.05, at 30-28 (1982) (case not
moot if controversy is type likely to recur between parties not before the court).
When one of the parties in an action for declaratory relief adequately represents the
public interest, the policy favoring the prompt resolution of public issues becomes a persua-
sive consideration in determining whether to entertain an action for declaratory relief. De-
velopments in the Law-Declaratory Judgments-1941-1949, 62 HARv. L. REv. 787, 808
(1949). Similarly, when the facts of a case invoke the public's interest in efficient govern-
ment, a court is more likely to render a declaratory judgment. Id. at 875. A miscarriage of
justice caused by a Court's refusal to review a judgment also may militate in favor of grant-
ing declaratory relief. People ex rel. Lemon v. Supreme Court, 245 N.Y. 24, 35, 156 N.E. 84,
87 (1927); cf. New York Foreign Trade Zone Operators v. State Liquor Auth., 285 N.Y. 272,
277-78, 34 N.E.2d 316, 319 (1941) (federal policy to expedite foreign commerce a factor in
determining whether to grant relief).
31 See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
32 59 N.Y.2d at 151, 451 N.E.2d at 155, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 397; see State v. King, 36
N.Y.2d 59, 63, 324 N.E.2d 351, 354, 364 N.Y.S.2d 879, 882-83 (1975).
83 59 N.Y.2d at 151-52, 451 N.E.2d at 155, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 397; see Nigrone v. Murtagh,
36 N.Y.2d 421, 426, 330 N.E.2d 45, 47, 369 N.Y.S.2d 75, 79 (1975).
34 See supra notes 15 & 18 and accompanying text.
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dants avoids conflict with the policy of noninterference.3 5 It is sub-
mitted, however, that in view of the delicacy of the balance struck
by the Court in harmonizing declaratory relief with these policies,
the Court's refusal to address the propriety of reopening the crimi-
nal court judgment 6 is problematic. It is submitted that the Court
should have answered this issue in the negative, since such reopen-
ing would pose a dangerous risk of violating the policies against
delay in criminal trials and review of prior adjudications. It is
hoped that, when a future declaratory judgment is rendered under
the Erlbaum rule, the Court will allow the judgment to be re-
opened only in the most limited circumstances so as not to render
inappropriate an otherwise innovative and valid solution to a
pressing problem.
Catherine A. Brienza
CIVIL PRACTICE LAW AND RULES
Article 55--Appeals Generally
CPLR 5522: Appellate division lacks discretion to grant relief to a
defendant failing to take timely appeal, absent a united and in-
severable interest with a successful appellant
CPLR 5522 provides appellate courts with broad discretion to
fashion relief appropriate to the particular equities of a case before
them. This discretion is limited by the general rule that an appel-
"See supra note 15 and accompanying text. The Erlbaum Court expressly stated that
any declaration issued will not be determinative of the ongoing criminal proceeding. 59
N.Y.2d at 155, 451 N.E.2d at 157, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 399. Therefore, the criminal trial will not
be interfered with even if the ruling is found to have been incorrect. Id.
11 59 N.Y.2d at 152 n.3, 451 N.E.2d at 155 n.3, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 397 n.3.
37 See CPLR 5522 (1978). CPLR 5522 provides in pertinent part that "[a] court to
which an appeal is taken may reverse, affirm, or modify, wholly or in part, any judgment, or
order before it, as to any party." Id. This rule is derived from subdivision 1 of CPA section
584, Civil Practice Act, ch. 925, § 584, [1920] N.Y. Laws 205, and is identical to article VI,
section 8 of the New York Constitution. 7 WK&M 5522.02 (1982); see CPLR 5522, com-
mentary at 221 (1978). The purpose of the rule is to allow appellate courts to "render
whatever decree the justice of the case requires." SECOND REP. at 339, 340; CPLR 5522,
commentary at 222 (1978); see, e.g., Ferrari v. Johnson & Johnson, 42 App. Div. 2d 940, 940,
348 N.Y.S.2d 139, 139-40 (1st Dep't 1973) (reviewing court could require plaintiff's attorney
to pay costs to defendants for causing delay); Copp v. Bowser, 22 App. Div. 2d 105, 109, 254
N.Y.S.2d 200, 203 (3d Dep't 1964) (concept of fairness mandated new trial as to jury verdict
against motorist when lower court incorrectly held accident victim had no claim against
truck driver); SIEGEL § 543, at 759; 7 WK&M I 5522.02, at 55-183 (1982). Generally, the
